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Abstract 9 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛoverall carbon emissions fell by 6% in 2016 due to cleaner electricity production.  This was 10 
not due to a surge in low-carbon nuclear or renewable sources; instead it was the much-overlooked 11 
impact of fuel switching from coal to natural gas generation.  This Perspective considers the enabling 12 
conditions in Britain and the potential for rapid fuel switching in other coal-reliant countries.  We find 13 
that spare generation and fuel supply-chain capacity must already exist for fuel switching to deliver 14 
rapid carbon savings, and to avoid further high-carbon infrastructure lock-in.  More important is the 15 
political will to alter the marketplace and incentivise this switch, for example through a strong and 16 
stable carbon price.  With the right incentives, fuel switching in the power sector could rapidly achieve 17 
on the order of 1 GtCO2 saving per year worldwide (3% of global emissions), buying precious time to 18 
slow the growth in cumulative carbon emissions. 19 
 20 
Introduction 21 
Global carbon emissions from fossil fuels stand at almost 37 GtCO2/yr and have grown by an average 22 
2.4% per year so far this century1.  While emissions had stabilised between 2014 and 2016 they appear 23 
to be increasing once again2, intensifying the need to reduce global fossil fuel consumption.  Switching 24 
away from fossil fuels is ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ŬĞǇ ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?3 ŽĨ  ‘ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?4 in the 25 
transport sector, but switching between fossil fuels in the power sector lacks such recognition5 as it is 26 
incompatible with longer-term deep decarbonisation. 27 
Power sector decarbonisation has received most attention with the rollout of renewables, especially 28 
wind and solar, which have grown twenty-fold in the last 15 years to reach 5% of global electricity 29 
generation6. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is often considered an essential component of least-30 
2 
cost decarbonisation7,8; however, it may take another three decades to achieve a 10% share of 31 
electricity generation9, amid very low expectations for CCS in the current environment10 after 32 
continued delays and cancellations11. With cumulative carbon emissions being a major determinant 33 
of climate change12, any early opportunities to reduce emissions within months rather than decades 34 
deserve attention.  Fuel switching between fossil fuels cannot be a long-term option as electrical 35 
generation from unabated natural gas still emits around four tenths that of coal13; and if shale gas is 36 
used, upstream methane emissions may add a further 25% to its carbon intensity14. 37 
However, Britain has recently demonstrated the short-term impact of fuel switching.  Displacing coal 38 
with natural gas reduced per-capita annual emissions by 400 kgCO2 between 2015 and 2016, equal to 39 
6% of national emissions15. Given the long-lived nature of energy systems and their endemic inertia, 40 
this rate of change is remarkable in the absence of any major accident or disaster. Figure 1 puts these 41 
changes in context, against market-led fuel switching in China and the US, renewables deployment in 42 
Germany, and incremental efficiency improvements in Poland. The unprecedented deployment of 43 
nuclear power lowered French carbon intensity by 40 g/kWh each year for a decade (1977 W1986)16,17.  44 
Fuel switching can proceed faster, but not so far: ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐĂƌďŽŶŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇĨĞůůďǇ85 g/kWh in 2016, 45 
but its potential is close to exhaustion as coal is almost eliminated. 46 
 47 
Figure 1: Carbon intensity of electricity generation in six countries over the last half-century.  Carbon intensity for gross 48 
electricity output (not accounting for losses in transmission and distribution).  The legend indicates the depth and duration of 49 
sustained reductions in emissions intensity within each country.  Data from refs. 16,17. 50 
This Perspective argues that with the right conditions, both in terms of pre-existing infrastructure and 51 
political will, switching away from coal has an important role to play in the rapid early decarbonisation 52 
of power systems. This provides immediate benefits to other sectors, which will decarbonise faster 53 
through electrification due to lower associated emissions. 54 
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ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ 55 
Coal was the largest source of electricity generation for the ĨŝƌƐƚŚƵŶĚƌĞĚǇĞĂƌƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌ56 
system. This changed in the early-1990s (Figure 2) when the newly-liberalised market invested in 57 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), for reasons unrelated to carbon mitigation18. 58 
   
Figure 2: Electricity generation by fuel type in three countries over the last 25 years.  Electricity generation over time for (a) 59 
Great Britain, (b) Germany and (c) the US. Shares of fossil fuel generation are indicated by the bracketed regions. Imports are 60 
not included, waste is included with biomass.  Between 2014 and 2016 coal + lignite generation fell by 5% in Germany, 22% 61 
in the US and 70% in Britain.  Data from refs. 19,20,56,85. 62 
This  ‘ĚĂƐŚ-for-ŐĂƐ ?in Britain was not replicated in Germany or elsewhere in Europe, and although 63 
ƚĞƌŵĞĚĂ ‘ĚĂƐŚ ?ŝƚtook eight years (1991 W99) for new gas capacity to be built and halve ĐŽĂů ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞ64 
of generation19 from 66% to 34%. Over the last decade, the US has shifted away from coal and lignite20 65 
as shale gas production significantly reduced the price of natural gas. More recently, the combination 66 
of fuel switching and coal plant retirements in Britain has seen coal ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ share fall three-67 
quarters to 9% in just four years (2012 W16); helping to halve power sector emissions from 158 MtCO2 68 
in 2012 to 78 MtCO2 in 2016.  This fuel switch drove the largest ever annual reduction in British power 69 
sector CO2 emissions21 of 25 MtCO2 in 2016. 70 
Figure 2 shows that renewable generation expanded rapidly over the last decade to supply nearly a 71 
ĨŝĨƚŚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇ ?However, the fall in coal generation between 2015 and 2016 was filled 72 
entirely by natural gas: coal output fell 46 TWh and gas output increased 43 TWh, while zero-carbon 73 
renewables changed by less than 1 TWh due to underlying weather conditions22.  &ŽƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ74 
switch from coal to gas in 2016 was greater than all other European countries combined23. 75 
If sustained, this rapid reduction arguably puts Britain well ahead of its near-term carbon reduction 76 
trajectory, as it could now beat its carbon targets for 2018-22 within the timeframe of the 2013-2017 77 
carbon budget24. However, as power sector emissions are part of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 78 
(referred to as the traded sector), the net UK carbon accounting25 means that these reductions can be 79 
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 ‘ĞǆƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌƐĞĐƚŽƌĂƐĂƐƵƌƉůƵƐƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞĚƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?e.g. heavy industry) 80 
potentially in other countries in Europe. Under agreed carbon accounting rules, they cannot be 81 
allocated to, or purchased by the non-traded sectors in Britain (e.g. domestic transport or heat) to 82 
provide additional carbon headroom26. Nevertheless, the significant reduction in electricity carbon 83 
intensity provides a direct benefit for decarbonising these sectors through electric vehicles and heat. 84 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽreduce coal power 85 
During the run up to COP21 in Paris, the British government began consulting on the phase-out of 86 
unabated coal by 202527,28 ? ŵĂƌŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĂďĂŶĚŽŶŝŶŐ ĐŽĂů ƉŽǁĞƌ29. 87 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚŝƐ ĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ ŚĞůƉƐ ĨƌĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?s commitment to decarbonisation, there is 88 
concern that early power station closures pose an unacceptable security of supply risk. From another 89 
perspective, it is felt increasingly important to remove unabated coal as soon as is practical to free up 90 
its market share for new, cleaner generation30. 91 
^ĐŚĞĚƵůŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞŵŝƐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ coal generation has been eased by ƚŚĞĨůĞĞƚ ?ƐĂŐĞ (80% are over 30 92 
years old), and tightening air pollution controls such as the Industrial Emissions Directive31. Half of 93 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?14.3 GW) closed in the 5 years to 2017, and those that remain have historically 94 
low utilisation. Coal provided less than 10% (28 TWh) of electrical generation in 2016; a smaller 95 
contribution than wind (30.5 TWh) and less than solar generated in Germany (37.5 TWh)32 over the 96 
same year. 97 
Britain is therefore on track to become the first major economy to transition away from coal after 98 
centuries of production and consumption (Figure 3).  The latter fell to 12 Mt in 201633, levels not seen 99 
since 193534.  The rate of this change is unprecedented; it took 14 years for power sector coal demand 100 
to increase from 12 to 28 million tonnes per annum (1936 to 1950), but only 1 year to make the reverse 101 
transition (2015 to 2016).  Britain could be the first country to leave its coal reserves unburnt in the 102 
ground35, and in November 2017 it set out a global alliance to end coal power generation36. This would 103 
have been inconceivable to policymakers even a generation ago, when coal, nuclear and oil generation 104 
powered the country18. 105 
5 
 106 
Figure 3: Quantity of coal mined and consumed for power generation in Britain. Power sector data from ref. 19 and coal 107 
production data from refs. 33 and 34. 108 
Factors that enabled ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛrapid fuel switch 109 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĨƵĞůƐǁŝƚĐŚŝŶŐĐĂŶďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐĂƉŽůŝĐǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ, albeit at a rate that was better 110 
than anticipated.  We suggest four factors were necessary to achieve this rapid fuel switch: first, gas 111 
generation plants were already built and had spare underutilised capacity; second, existing fuel supply 112 
infrastructure could cope with the increased power sector gas demand; third, the political will was 113 
available to intervene in markets to incentivise the switch, penalising coal vs. gas generation via an 114 
effective carbon price; Finally, coal and gas prices were sufficiently close so that switching did not 115 
inflict large price rises on electricity consumers (a carbon price of £50/t was needed to incentivise fuel 116 
switching in 2013, compared to £16/t in 2016)13. 117 
Renewable generation has also rapidly increased in Britain (Figure 2), lowering emissions over the last 118 
decade.  However, significant emissions reductions only began in 2013 due to the declining share of 119 
coal as carbon prices began to rise, as will be discussed in detail below. 120 
While putting a price on carbon enabled the fuel switch in 2015 to be rapid, the development of this 121 
policy and the enabling conditions and the investment in generation and infrastructure for the switch 122 
to take place were decades in the making.  The EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (2001)37 and 123 
Industrial Emissions Directive (2010)31 ĂŝĚĞĚŝŶĐůŽƐŝŶŐŚĂůĨŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞůŝŵĂƚĞ124 
Change Act (2008)38 and Electricity Market Reform (2013)39 laid the foundations for the Carbon Price 125 
Support scheme. 126 
Putting a price on carbon 127 
Our view is that tŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĚƌŝǀĞƌĨŽƌĐŽĂů ?ƐƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? W16 was the higher price placed on 128 
carbon emissions.  Since 2005 British power stations were subject to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 129 
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6 
(ETS) but it delivered carbon prices that were too weak to drive sustained lower-carbon investment40 W130 
43. To address this, Britain introduced the Carbon Price Support (CPS) policy in 2013 which required 131 
power-sector emitters to pay a top-up price to a Carbon Price Floor (CPF) determined by 132 
policymakers44. This aims to provide generators with the certainty of a more stable (but higher) price 133 
of CO2 than delivered by the EU-wide market alone. 134 
This CPS policy is still subject to regulatory risk as the floor price can be changed.  Its initial trajectory 135 
was rising towards £70/tCO2 in 2030; however, successive announcements have frozen the CPS rate 136 
at its 2017 level of £18/tCO2 at least until 2021.  While this suggests diminished ambition in the face 137 
of cost sensitivities, it should be compared to an EU-ETS price ŽĨĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ? ?/tCO2 throughout 138 
2016. 139 
Debate continues about the floor price45 W47.  Whilst it has been effective in promoting the switch from 140 
coal to existing natural gas generation, it has failed to incentivise construction of new low-carbon 141 
generation, which continues to require other forms of financial support.  The cost to consumers can 142 
be roughly approximated from Figure 4a as the gap between the actual electricity price and the 143 
estimated cost of the marginal fuel (whichever is more expensive, gas or coal).  We estimate the 144 
carbon price floor has added in the region of 0.7 p/kWh to retail prices (~5%) during 2016.  This rough 145 
estimate is indeed comparable to government analysis48 and estimates for UK industry49. This price 146 
rise is very modest considering the ~25% reduction in power sector emissions it facilitated in just one 147 
year. 148 
  149 
7 
 150 
  
Figure 4: Wholesale price of electricity in Britain with the competitive benchmark based on fuel and carbon prices. (a) 151 
Electricity prices compared with the estimated cost of generation from coal and gas with no carbon price. (b) The same 152 
comparison including the prevailing carbon price (CPF CO2) in Britain. The solid grey shading plots the share of total electricity 153 
generation from coal.  Generation cost consists of fuel combusted (divided by conversion efficiency) and carbon emitted 154 
(multiplied by carbon price), neglecting other aspects such as maintenance and network charges. Prices and costs have 155 
quarterly resolution, the coal generation share has annual resolution.  Carbon price data from refs.44  and 86 , fuel price data 156 
from ref. 87, electricity price and coal share data from ref. 13.  Electricity prices represent the day-ahead spot market. 157 
The costs of electricity generation are shown in Figure 4, highlighting the falling cost of gas relative to 158 
coal since 2014. However, coal would still be the cheapest form of generation with the European ETS 159 
carbon price, despite the sharp rise in international coal prices through 2016 (due to China cutting 160 
production by 10%)50.  Instead, the CPF allowed gas generation to become equivalent or cheaper since 161 
the beginning of 2016 and to displace ĐŽĂů ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶƚĞƌms of historical precedence, 162 
the carbon price in Britain has been raised back to its level in 2008.  In the rest of Europe, it remains 163 
at just one-third of its peak. 164 
Fuel switching is not unidirectional, and could equally be reversed while coal generation capacity 165 
remains available over the coming years, helped by capacity market payments.  All this would take is 166 
another shift in relative fuel prices or a weakening of the carbon price ƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĐŽĂů ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ167 
share. 168 
Leaving the markets to it 169 
Britain ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ ůŝďĞƌĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ĐĂŶ ƌĂƉŝĚůǇ ĂĚũƵƐƚ ƚŽ ǁĞůů-timed well-aimed policy 170 
signals.  Policy is not an essential ingredient though, as America demonstrates that a confluence of 171 
market factors can drive fuel switching alone, albeit at a slower pace.51 W53  Since 2005, natural gas 172 
prices have fallen 70% compared to 25% for coal due to increased production and the inability to 173 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
£0
£10
£20
£30
£40
£50
£60
2000 2005 2010 2015
G
en
er
at
io
n
 C
o
st
 
(£/
M
W
h)
Coal Share Coal (fuel only)
Gas (fuel only) Electricity (wholesale)
Sh
ar
e 
o
f c
o
al
 g
en
er
at
io
n
(a)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
£0
£10
£20
£30
£40
£50
£60
2000 2005 2010 2015
G
en
er
at
io
n
 C
o
st
 
(£/
M
W
h)
Coal Share Coal + CPF CO΍
Gas + CPF CO΍ Electricity (wholesale)
Sh
ar
e 
o
f c
o
al
 g
en
er
at
io
n
(b)
8 
export shale gas6 (due to insufficient infrastructure). This has lowered the US average carbon intensity 174 
of electricity by a quarter (see Figure 1), with a 5 percentage point swing from coal to gas20 occurring 175 
in 2015, reducing power sector emissions by over 130 Mt54. 176 
The political landscape changed with the election of President Trump in November 2016, suggesting 177 
ongoing tensions between Federal efforts to revive an ailing coal sector, and many State policies that 178 
focus on decarbonisation. Carbon pricing at a federal level which would accelerate fuel switching from 179 
coal to natural gas is therefore improbable under the Trump administration. The US has a complex 180 
range of political drivers from federal environmental regulations impacted by sector lobbying, layered 181 
with further political drivers at state level. Within this melange of political and market forces, it is 182 
difficult to suggest future levels of fuel switching with any degree of certainty. Federal regulations 183 
have switched back and forth to favour different technologies, which suggests the benefit of having 184 
legal multi-decadal targets to aim for. Britain is not immune from lobbying and switching regulations 185 
back and forth to suit different technologies, but it has pioneered the use of long-term legal targets in 186 
the 2008 Climate Change Act38. This has kept the long-term ambition on track regardless of the change 187 
of policy makers and the political pressure to rescind policies that become unpopular with core voters. 188 
Potential for fuel switching in Germany 189 
Germany is regarded as a champion of renewable energy for its extensive investment in wind and 190 
solar power.  However, it has had limited success in decarbonising its power sector, with emissions 191 
ĚŽǁŶ ? ?A?ƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛreduction of 61%. Figure 5 shows that 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨ192 
progress is due to continued reliance on lignite and hard coal for >40% of electricity supply. 193 
  194 
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 195 
  
Figure 5: Power sector CO2 emissions by fuel source in Germany and Britain.  The carbon price in each country is overlaid as 196 
a dotted line ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂƌďŽŶWƌŝĐĞ&ůŽŽƌŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?It is our view that 197 
this was the major additional factor that caused the rapid shift from coal to natural gas generation after 2013. Generation 198 
mix data from refs. 19 and 56, emissions intensities from refs. 32 and 13, and carbon prices from refs. 44 and 86. 199 
Germany is self-sufficient for lignite but imports 89% of its hard coal55, as its geology makes local 200 
production internationally uncompetitive.  Import dependency for natural gas is similarly 90%, 201 
although only one-sixth of demand is from the power sector as gas is primarily used for heating56.  202 
Around 15bcm/year (~150 TWh/year) of spare capacity exists in the Nordstream pipeline for increased 203 
gas supplies57, with an additional 55bcm/year (540 TWh/year) if Nordstream 2 is constructed. At a 204 
national level, it seems the fuel supply infrastructure has the potential to accommodate significant 205 
levels of fuel switching. 206 
However, several factors ƚĞŵƉĞƌ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ƚŚŝƐ ƌŽƵƚĞ ? ŶŽƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ207 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐǁĂƉƉŝŶŐŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐůŝŐŶŝƚĞƚŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĞĚŶĂƚƵƌĂůŐĂƐ ?'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞ208 
nuclear generation provides an additional challenge: installing 60 GW of wind and solar power in the 209 
last decade has done little more than offset the lost output from the 10 GW of retired nuclear power32.  210 
Both considerations were not applicable to Britain, which has no lignite mines, and, in contrast to 211 
Germany, is embracing new nuclear build. Germany is a fascinating interaction of political economy 212 
interests, with a lignite lobby that capitalises on security of supƉůǇĂŶĚĐŽƐƚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ213 
energy transition. However, without the development of carbon capture and storage in Germany 214 
(which currently seems highly challenging), lignite generation will at some point be impossible to 215 
reconcile with decarbonisation targets. ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĨƵĞůŵŝǆcould be 216 
rapidly changed given their pre-built but underutilised gas generation capacity. 217 
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10 
Germany has 24 GW of gas-fired power stations, compared to 28 GW of hard coal and 21 GW of 218 
lignite32.  In recent years, nearly-new gas power stations have been mothballed after proving 219 
unprofitable, and eventually exported to the Middle East58.  This is because gas capacity lies mostly 220 
unused, with 18% utilisation compared to 40% for hard coal and 74% for lignite in 201656.  An 221 
additional 155 TWh of electricity could be produced if this gas generation capacity were utilised at 222 
80%, sufficient to completely eliminate hard coal plus four-tenths of lignite production, which would 223 
ĐƵƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƐĞĐƚŽƌĞŵŝƐƐŝons by around a quarter, or 62 MtCO2 per year. 224 
Greater emissions savings would result from displacing lignite.  However, this would increase primary 225 
energy import dependency; whereas switching from hard coal to natural gas would simply switch one 226 
type of energy imports for another, introducing a different set of risks. 227 
Potential for fuel switching globally 228 
Quantifying a more accurate global potential for fuel switching require a detailed country-by-country 229 
analysis of infrastructure, generation, security of supply, demand, prices, and political interests; and 230 
will be a valuable area of future work.  Nonetheless, the broad order-of-magnitude can be estimated 231 
using existing statistics for annual generation and installed generating capacity.  We estimate the 232 
potential for fuel switching in the 30 largest coal consuming nations (covering 97% of global coal 233 
capacity) by compiling the amount of coal and lignite generation in 2015, and comparing this to the 234 
additional generation that could come from gas in each country.  This is based on existing, 235 
underutilised gas generation; disregarding the option of building new capacity.  The maximum gas 236 
generation potential assumes that combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) could run up to 80% 237 
utilisation (limited by availability and downtime), while open-cycle (OCGTs) and steam boiler stations 238 
would be limited to 0 W40% utilisation (due to economic rationale).  Displacing coal with single-cycle 239 
(rather than combined-cycle) gas stations would yield half the carbon savings due to their lower 240 
efficiency and thus higher carbon intensity.  We assume CO2 emissions of 405 g/kWh for CCGTs and 241 
710 g/kWh for OCGTs, relative to 1025±55 g/kWh for national coal fleets16.  Sources, details and 242 
justification are given in the Methods section. 243 
Figure 6a shows the potential for fuel switching across the OECD and coal-reliant developing countries.  244 
Many European countries (including Britain) have over-built power systems with sufficient idle gas 245 
capacity to completely eliminate coal, at least at the annual aggregate level.  Of the largest coal 246 
consumers, Russia and the US could convert 40 W50% of their coal generation to gas, but China and 247 
India could only displace 6 W12% due to the vast scale of their coal fleets. 248 
11 
Poland depends on solid fuels for over 90% of its electricity, and lacks the pre-existing gas plants to 249 
take over market share59.  Japan is still gripped by a capacity shortage in the wake of the Fukushima 250 
disaster and shutdown of its nuclear fleet, thus its gas stations are running close to capacity already. 251 
Figure 6b shows that if fuel switching was fully realised in these 30 countries, annual emissions could 252 
fall by 0.8 W1.2 GtCO2, around 3% of global emissions.  Reductions in China, India and Europe amount 253 
to 440 MtCO2 per year, and are insensitive to the utilisation of single-cycle plants as these make up 254 
only a fifth of their gas fleet.  The mitigation potential in the US and Russia is more sensitive to the 255 
assumed utilisation, as OCGTs and steam boilers form half their gas capacity. 256 
  
Figure 6: Estimation of the carbon mitigation potential from fuel switching in 30 countries.  (a) Comparison of output from 257 
coal power stations in 2015 with the potential for additional gas generation, if existing combined-cycle gas plants operated 258 
at 80% utilisation and single-cycle plants at 20% (with bars showing 0% to 40%).  (b) The annual greenhouse-gas emission 259 
savings if the identified potential for fuel switching was realised across these countries, showing the sensitivity to the 260 
utilisation of single-cycle gas plants. In panel (a), countries are identified using their two-letter ISO codes, and diagonal lines 261 
highlight the share of coal that could be displaced by gas.  Colours are used to group countries into the geographic regions 262 
listed in the legend of panel (b).  The four countries with zero potential for additional gas output (Mexico, Kazakhstan, Poland 263 
and Japan) are shown below the axis.  Data from sources listed in the Methods section. 264 
No Silver Bullet 265 
While this analysis is only a first-order approximation (noting the simplifications listed in the Methods 266 
section), it suggests that fuel switching in the power sector could provide a significant boost to global 267 
decarbonisation.  However, fuel switching is no silver bullet, and many barriers can explain why only 268 
a small percentage of the estimated potential has been realised thus far. 269 
Fuel switching will change supply-chain and energy security risks, and in many countries would create 270 
political tensions by increasing import dependency for primary energy.  Although employment in the 271 
coal sector has fallen dramatically in many western countries, policies which are seen to further 272 
decimate domestic mining industries will face opposition, as seen in America. Over the longer term, 273 
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politicians must grapple with the consequences of transitioning away from solid fuels; notably how to 274 
engage and retrain affected mining communities where coal production is culturally significant, as well 275 
as a source of employment. 276 
There are also risks with carbon leakage in highly interconnected markets such as Germany60,61.  A 277 
strong carbon price to promote fuel switching can reduce within-country emissions, but may also shift 278 
electricity production (and thus carbon emissions) to areas subject to a lower carbon price. Britain 279 
now imports high-carbon electricity from the Netherlands, where coal usage increased 40% and 280 
generators pay one-fifth the carbon price.  Supranational harmonisation of carbon pricing is needed 281 
to avoid the 'offshoring' of power sector emissions.  Other considerations, such as the level of methane 282 
leakage in the natural gas supply chain must also be carefully assessed62,63. 283 
Carbon pricing however is not a blanket policy that will work everywhere.  In countries that lack the 284 
gas infrastructure such as Poland or Japan, raising a carbon price would in the short term be no less 285 
blunt than a blanket tax on electricity.  In the longer term, a careful balance is needed to redirect how 286 
existing infrastructure could be used without going so far as to incentivise building new gas 287 
infrastructure and avoidable carbon lock-in.  If limiting global temperature rise to 2°C requires no more 288 
carbon-emitting electricity generation to be built64, the distinction between utilising existing gas 289 
generation versus investing in additional capacity is of critical importance65,66. 290 
Conclusions 291 
Switching between fossil fuels can only ever be a temporary stepping stone towards a low-carbon 292 
energy system.  Its potential is bounded by the scale of existing coal and gas infrastructure, and natural 293 
gas is incompatible with deep decarbonisation67,68 unless carbon capture and storage emerges from 294 
ŝƚƐ  ‘ǀĂůůĞǇŽĨĚĞĂƚŚ ?11.  If spare capacity already exists, then fuel switching does not require several 295 
years to amount to material emissions savings, unlike other key options (renewables, nuclear, 296 
efficiency improvements).  dŚĞ ‘ƋƵŝĐŬ ǁŝŶ ?ŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƐŝŵƉůǇďǇƵƐŝŶŐƉƌĞ-existing infrastructure more 297 
effectively. 298 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐunder certain key circumstances of placing a modest, 299 
but stable, £18/tCO2 on carbon, and the speed with which the power sector generation changed in 300 
response to such a signal; it switched 15% of its generation mix (45 TWh) in a single year, saving 25 301 
MtCO2. Fuel switching can demonstrably achieve very rapid carbon reductions. In comparison 302 
renewables took six years to grow from 4% tŽ ? ?A?ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ?Ă  ? ?dtŚ ?Ǉƌ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ? ?303 
saving approximately13 22 MtCO2.  It will be at least 10 years before new nuclear capacity will be built 304 
in Britain58, which would require three projects the size of Hinkley Point C to save 27 MtCO2 per year69 305 
to fuel switch from natural gas (as coal will no longer be in the system). 306 
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Fuel switching can also be a cost-effective and convenient form of decarbonisation.  If driven solely by 307 
market forces it will lower bills; if policy support alters the balance between closely-priced fuels, it can 308 
have minimal impact on consumers, as seen in Britain.  Natural gas retains the energy system benefits 309 
of being a fuel: controllable and dispatchable generation, and extensive storage infrastructure with 310 
days to weeks of capacity, rather than minutes to hours for electrochemical and thermal storage70,71.  311 
Controllable flexibility is increasingly desirable to accommodate greater levels of variable renewable 312 
energy generation, especially so if coal generation is simultaneously being retired. 313 
Anthropogenic carbon emissions had almost plateaued in 20162.  The next, momentous step  W for 314 
emissions to decrease  W could be catalysed by a concerted global effort to switch away from coal to 315 
natural gas.  Our initial examination suggests the top 30 coal consuming countries could prevent 1 Gt 316 
of CO2 emissions from entering the atmosphere annually; with a central estimate that 20% of the 317 
ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĐŽĂůĐŽƵůĚďĞƐǁŝƚĐŚĞĚƚŽŐĂƐƵƐŝŶŐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌ-utilised infrastructure (the range is 13% 318 
with no OCGT up to 27% with them running at 40% utilisation).  This provides an immediate benefit 319 
to slow the increase in cumulative carbon emissions, buying all-important time for other sectors to 320 
catch up, and providing cleaner electricity with which to decarbonise them.  Any effort to front-load 321 
emissions reductions will ease the pressure on future generations who are faced with removing 322 
emissions from the atmosphere72.  However, it is vital to cumulative emissions that the gains of early 323 
decarbonisation from fuel switching are not squandered by the extended use of gas generation as a 324 
substitute for the necessary increase in low-carbon technologies. 325 
The potential for rapid and material global emissions reductions appears to have gone unnoticed thus 326 
far; it is about time that the benefits of fuel switching received greater attention. 327 
 328 
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